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The paper presents empirical evidence of AIDS epidemic e¤ects on demography va-
riables and accumulable factors. Using a panel of 47 Sub-Saharan African countries, we
show that AIDS has negative and signicant e¤ect on life expectancy and fertility rate.
Thus, a one percent increase in AIDS prevalence rate leads to a decrease of one month
every year of the life expectancy in average. We also show that AIDS has a negative e¤ect
on investment rate, capital intensity and primary and secondary enrollment rate. Howe-
ver, we cannot nd a global e¤ect of AIDS on GDP per capita. This outline the di¤erence
between the short run and direct e¤ect of AIDS and the long run indirect e¤ect of the
epidemic.
Then, we propose a model that exhibits the poverty trap property the epidemic have.
Our model is an OLG economy which highlight the e¤ect of AIDS related health expen-
ditures on life expectancy.
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1 Introduction
The UNAIDS has released its 2008 "Report on the global AIDS epidemic" showing
that there were an estimated 33 million people living with AIDS in 2007 in the World. Sub-
Saharan Africa remains most heavily a¤ected by HIV, accounting for 67% of all people
living with HIV and for 72% of AIDS deaths in 2007. In some countries, as Botswana,
Lesotho and south Africa, the HIV prevalence rate among pregnant women attending
clinics is more than 30%.
The social and economic consequences of such epidemic are huge. Families are broken,
sometimes with an important number of orphans. The burden in family incumbering to
provide health care for infected people is heavy and, has consequences on savings and
investment. It also have important e¤ect on national public policies directing nance to
health care from others non satised needs. None has a doubt on the economic conse-
quences of AIDS on hit countries. However, rst estimation by Bloom and Mahal (1997)
in a cross-country perspective found no evidence that AIDS impedes growth. These esti-
mates have been criticized for the lack of appropriate data, since they were based on data
for the period 1980-1992, when AIDS prevalence were low. Others estimates, in this rst
wave of tentative to assess the macroeconomic e¤ects of HIV/AIDS were by Cuddington
(1993) and, Cuddington and Hancock (1994). They examined the impact of AIDS on
individual countries showing that the negative e¤ects on Malawi and Botswana GDP per
capita or growth rate were important.
A second wave of studies aiming to assess the impact of AIDS on growth nd more
evidence of the negative e¤ects of the epidemic. Bonnel (2000) concluded from a cross-
country study that AIDS on average reduced Africas per capita growth by 0.7% points.
McDonald and Roberts (2006), departing from studies that use cross-country cross-section
method, estimate the AIDSe¤ects on growth in a cross-country panel data. They found
that, in Africa, the marginal impact on income per capita of a 1% increase in HIV pre-
valence rate is minus 0.59%. Thus, at least, there is still debates on the magnitude of the
AIDS impact on growth.
This paper has two goal. The rst one is to assess and separate the empirical e¤ects of
AIDS on variables that matters for growth, namely demographic and factors accumulable
variables, from the e¤ects on GDP per capita and growth. Doing so, we expect to di¤e-
rentiate the long run and short run e¤ects of the epidemic. The second goal is to derive
a theoretical model, focusing on the e¤ect of the disease on life expectancy and human
capital investment, to outline the poverty trap the epidemic potentially have.
Our estimates, based on data from the UNAIDS for 47 Sub-Saharan Africa, indicate
that AIDS reduce life expectancy by one month every year for a 1% increase of the
epidemics. It also have substantial negative e¤ect on fertility rate. These results di¤ers
from the ndings of Kalemli-Ozcan (2006) who depict a positive e¤ect of AIDS on fertility.
The e¤ect on capital intensity and on investment rate are also negative. The impacts of
AIDS in education are also negative. We the estimate the global e¤ect on GDP per
capital and nd no signicant evidence of AIDS e¤ect on it. The one way to reconcile
these ndings is that the long run e¤ects of AIDS have not already completely occurred.
We then build a model in which AIDS epidemic can inuence long-run growth. It is an
OLG economy where individuals live potentially for three periods : youth, adulthood and
old age. Every individual is a member of a family household. In each household there is a
constant exogenous share of the member who are HIV positive. There are two factors of
production : physical capital and Labor, which is a sum of e¢ cient unit of human capital.
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The physical capital is not accumulable, it is completely consumed during the process of
production. This assumption ease the resolution of the model and is not completely at
odds with some patterns of African economies.
The accumulation of human capital depends on three inputs, education expenses,
time and parental human capital. Each child is endowed with one unit of time which can
be devoted to learning or to working on the behalf of their parents to increase income.
Adults make time allocation decisions for their children. They also make decisions on
how to allocate family income between consumption, savings and AIDS related medical
expenditures.
Our approach di¤ers from earlier theoretical research in this area. Corrigan, Glomm
and Mendez (2005) model is the closest to our approach. However, we di¤er in some
important aspect that is, they model health expenditures as utility enhancing goods,
while we consider that health expenditures improve the life expectancy of HIV positive
people. This specication allow us to show that AIDS epidemic can generate a poverty
trap for the economy. The occurrence of such poverty trap depends on the degree of which
the epidemics had spread into the economy. A huge number of people contaminated in the
country can settle the economy in a poverty trap. We show that, in such case, subsidizing
education is not e¢ cient to escape the economy from the poverty trap. Either, subsidizing
health care expenditures is e¢ cient only for some degree of expansion of the epidemics.
The next section presents the econometric analysis. Section 3 set up the model. In
section 4 we develop the policy analysis.
2 Econometric Analysis
2.1 The data
The data are from several international institutions and cover 47 countries of Sub-
Saharan Africa on a yearly basis from 1970 to 20062. Data on HIV/AIDS epidemic are
from the UNAIDS fact sheets, which detail the spread of HIV infection on each UN coun-
try using several sources. The most reliable and comparable variable, both in time and
space are HIV/AID prevalence rate among pregnant women in both rural and urban areas
and reported AIDS cases. We mainly use HIV/AID prevalence rate among pregnant wo-
men. Missing data have been extrapolated using reported AIDS cases. HIV prevalence
rate among total population is calculated as a weighting average of HIV prevalence rate
among rural and urban population. The prevalence rate is a good measure of the progres-
sion of the epidemics. Urbanization data are from United Nations World Urbanization
Prospects (2007) (UNWUP)3. In African countries the rate of education enrolment is
correlated with the level of urbanization and the latter is also linked to HIV/AID pro-
gression. Infant mortality data are available on a ve-year average basis in the UNWUP.
We compute the annual data with an algorithm that minimizes the yearly variation of the
annual growth rate of data taking the value of the series in the years 1970, 1975, 1980,
1985 and 1990 as given. This procedure is therefore very similar to an Hodrick-Prescott
lter. Fertility and life expectancy data are published by the World Bank every two or
three years since 1960. We compute the annual data with the same procedure as before.
Demographic data, such as working age population are from UN data. Estimates of GDP
and net formation of xed capital (in constant US$) are provided by the United Nations
2A sum up of available data by country can be found in appendix.
3The 2007 Revision Population Database
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Statistics Division. Education data including primary and secondary enrolment rate and
the ratio of the number of pupil per teacher on the primary level are from UNESCO
data. These data are available yearly since 1990 and every ve year from 1960 to 1990.
Missing years are extrapolated from ve-year data using our smoothing algorithm. The
data on conicts are extracted from the third version of the Armed Conict Dataset of
the Uppsala Conict Data Program, Uppsala University (UCDP) and International Peace
Research Institute (Oslo) (UCDP/PRIO, December 2007). This dataset contains annual
observations of conicts about all members of the international system, as dened by
Gleditsch & Ward (1999), between 1946 and 2006.
Table 1 : Descriptive statistics
Variable Numb. of obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
GDP per worker ($) 1 662 1 482.78 1 933.45 98.41 19 375.93
Pop. (in work age) 1 702 5 714.5 8 960.32 35.662 76 655.7
Fertility 1 726 6.03 1.26 1.91 8.50
Life expectancy 1 727 50.71 7.64 23.64 73.17
Infant Mortality (%) 1 610 109.60 36.84 14.59 206.40
AIDS Prevalence (%) 1 545 3.40 6.61 0 41.73
Primary school 1 562 76.98 33.19 8.00 179.56
Secondary school 1 536 21.58 18.40 1.11 114.01
Urbanization (%) 1 739 28.99 14.31 2.4 84.09
Notes : Variables are averaged over 1970-2006. GDP per worker is the GDP over the
population in working age, which is thousands. Fertility is the total fertility rate per woman.
Life expectancy is at birth. Infant mortality is the infant mortality per 1000 births. AIDS
prevalence rate is the reported prevalence rate among pregnant woman. Primary school is
the total gross primary school enrollment. Secondary school is he total gross primary school
enrollment. Urbanization is the percentage of population in urban areas.
2.2 Results
2.2.1 AIDS and demography
HIVnAIDS is likely to a¤ect a country through di¤erent mechanisms and variables.
HIVnAIDS disease is not a one shot shock that decrease the population level of a country.
On the contrary, it is a long lasting disease, which can a¤ect demographic gures as life
expectancy, fertility rate and therefore the population level. We consider Sub-Saharan
African countries because it is the region most a¤ected by AIDS in terms of death. Our
estimation recover the 47 Sub-Saharan African countries from 1970 to 2006. Our concern
is whether and in which scale AIDS had an e¤ect on demographic variables.
AIDS reduces life expectancy in two ways. First, it is likely to increase infant mortality
by its impact on pregnant women and, secondly, it causes a huge number of death in
African countries due to the absence of the needed health care. To assess this e¤ect we
run the following panel regression with country xed e¤ects and a time trend :
LifeExpit = i+1Y ear+2AIDSit+3CONTROL1it+4CONTROL2it+ :::+"it (1)
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where i is the cross country xed e¤ect and "CONTROL" represent the additional
control variables. The xed e¤ects take into account the heterogeneity between countries
in terms of infrastructure, wealth or religion.
Results are given in Table 2. In the two regressions, AIDS has a signicant negative
e¤ect on life expectancy. A 1% increase in AIDS prevalence rate implies 0.07 years of
decrease in life expectance. The time trend (Year) captures the climbing trend in life
expectancy in the absence of AIDS. It shows a very slow progress on life expectancy in
the period. The variable Civdeath, indicating wether a country had experienced several
wars, has a strong negative e¤ect on life expectancy. Schooling does not seem to have
a strong e¤ect on life expectancy ; an increase in primary enrollment rate has a limited
positive e¤ect, while the e¤ect of secondary enrollment rate is not signicant.
We also analyze the impact of AIDS on fertility rate. Some theoretical models (see
Kalemli-Ozcan (2003)) predict that increased education of women reduces fertility due to
the raise in the cost of childbearing. In the same line, the higher cost of childbearing in
urban zone is associated with a decrease in fertility. The coe¢ cients of correlation between
the di¤erent variables (see appendix) show that GDP, urbanization, AIDS and education
are negatively correlated to fertility.
We run regression (1) with fertility rate as dependent variable. The results in table 2
show in column (3) and (4) that AIDS has a signicant negative e¤ect on fertility and
that an increase in secondary education reduce also the fertility rate. A 1% increase in
AIDS lessen the number of births by 0.03 in average per year. For a disease lasting more
than twenty years from now, it is a huge cumulated e¤ect. The time trend variable depict
a decreasing trend in fertility and urbanization also has a negative e¤ect on fertility. A
one percent increase of the urban population decreases the number of birth by 0.01.
Another important e¤ect of AIDS already emphasized in the literature is its impact
on working people. By its nature, AIDS is more likely to a¤ect young adult and therefore
hit the working population. However, our estimation of equation (1) with the working
population as dependent variable give a very little e¤ect of AIDS on working age popu-
lation. In estimation (6), AIDS have a negative e¤ect on working age population. While,
in estimation (7), when we remove the lagged variable of the working age population, the
e¤ect of AIDS on working population is positive and the coe¢ cient of the e¤ect of life
expectancy is much higher. It seems that the life expectancy variable reverse the e¤ect of
AIDS.
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Table 2 : The e¤ects of AIDS on demographic gures
Dependent variable Life expectancy Fertility working age pop.










































































































R2 (within) 0.98 0.98 0.68 0.72 0.99 0.99
Observations 1523 1411 1421 1373 1545 1545
Numb. of groups 44 44 44 44 44 44
Notes : This is a xed-e¤ects within regression with countries panel data. t values are in
parentheses. LogWPOP variable is the log of working age population. Civconict is the war
inside a specic country. * denotes not signicant at 5%. In the regression (4), it is Log GDP
per capita instead of Log GDP. The sign (_1) denotes that the variable is lagged one period.
2.2.2 AIDS and macroeconomic variables
In order to capture the economic e¤ect of AIDS, we investigate whether there have
been any impact on macroeconomic variables. To this end, we run the same estimation
regression described in equation (1) with macroeconomic variable as dependent variable.
The literature has emphasized the di¤erent mechanism through which AIDS a¤ect the
economy4. One aspect of AIDS, by its long lasting time, is to increase health expenditures
or to reduce the earnings of a household and, therefore decrease the saving capacity. Thus,
AIDS may induce a reduction in capital accumulation and investment and, then a decrease
in GDP growth.
Estimations of the impact of AIDS on those variables are given in table 3. The e¤ect
of AIDS on GDP per capita is negative and signicant once the e¤ects of civil conict are
4See Boucekkine, Diene and Azomahou (2007) for a survey.
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taken into account, though that it is very limited. The impact on GDP (in log) is also
negative. The conicts in the di¤erent countries appear to have strong negative impact
on GDP and GDP per capita.
AIDS has a positive and signicant e¤ect on capital intensity. This is due, in the short
run, to the capital deepening e¤ect of AIDS through its negative impact on working age
population. The time trend is negative showing a decreasing trend in capital intensity in
the absence of AIDS.
AIDS also have a negative and signicant a¤ect on the investment rate. A 1% increase
in AIDS prevalence rate leads to a decrease of the investment rate of 0.5% in average per
year. Civil death due to the conict has a negative impact on the investment rate. But,
an increase in the population reduce also the investment rate. In the African context, this
is from the necessity to address rst of all the consumption needs.
Table 3 : AIDSs e¤ects on macroeconomic variables
Dependent variable LogGDP per capita Log GDP Capital intensity LogInvest. rate














































































- - - - -
-0.003
(-2.23)
R2 (within) 0.92 0.93 0.96 0.99 0.99 0.12
Nb of observ. 1523 1523 1523 1523 1523 1411
Nb of groups 44 44 44 44 44 44
Notes : This is a xed-e¤ects within regression with countries panel data. t values are in parentheses.
* denotes not signicant at 5%. For estimation (7) and (8), it is Log GDP per capita_1 instead of
Log GDP_1. Capital intensity variables are in log.
2.2.3 AIDS, growth and education
Several studies have tried to estimate the global e¤ect of AIDS on growth. Early esti-
mates by Over (1992) and Cuddington and Hancock (1994) found evidence of a negative
important e¤ect of AIDS on growth. These estimates based of a country specic e¤ects
su¤er a lack of appropriate data. One of the rst estimates in a cross-country basis is by
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Bloom and Mahal (1997) who found no evidence of negative e¤ect of AIDS on growth.
However, their studies have been criticized for the limitations in the data they used. In-
deed, the time period of their estimates (1980-1992) is characterized by a growing, but
still limited, AIDS epidemic. More recently, McDonald and Roberts (2005) provide a new
estimation of the e¤ect of AIDS on growth through its impact on health capital. Their stu-
dies, based on more recent data from 1984 to 1999, is an estimation of a Solow-augmented
model, following Mankiw and al. (1992). They introduce health capital as a accumulable
factor as human and physical capital. Another di¤erence is that they use panel estimation
method applied to cross-country economic growth instead of cross-section method. They
found strong and signicant negative e¤ect of AIDS on growth.
We estimate a Solow augmented model-type by introducing AIDS variable, it appears
to have no e¤ect signicantly di¤erent from zero. Moreover, the estimation have a very
limited explicative power of the variation of GDP per capita. We run another regression
more structural with GDP in log as dependent variable and di¤erent variables of control.
We found that AIDS has no signicant e¤ect on GDP. Schooling at primary and secondary
level has a positive e¤ect on growth.
The impact of AIDS on education is more likely negative. In our estimation, the
impact of AIDS on primary school enrollment rate is negative when others variables as
civil conict are taken into account. Its e¤ect on secondary enrollment is also negative,
however non signicant. Kalemli-Ozcan (2005) found the same negative e¤ect of AIDS on
education in Sub-Saharan Africa.
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Table 4 : The e¤ects of AIDS on growth and education
Dependent variable GDP per capita LogGDP Primary Secondary
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R2 (within) 0.14 0.64 0.92 0.92 0.95 0.95
Nb of observations 1411 1411 1455 1455 1410 1390
Nb. of groups 44 44 44 44 44 44
Notes : This is a xed-e¤ects within regression with countries panel data. t values are in parentheses.
* denotes not signicant at 5% level. GDP per capita variables are in log.
Therofe, AIDS had limited consequences on growth in the short run in Sub-Saharan
Africa. However indirect e¤ects on factors accumulation indicate that AIDS may have
strong long-run e¤ects on growth. In the following, we present a theoretical model aiming
to describe and analyze this prediction.
3 The model
3.1 Background and main hypothesis
Epidemic have been model as sudden decreases of life expectancy or a destruction of
part of the labor supply in an hit economy. Classical OLG models show that a reduction
of life expectancy have steady state e¤ects on investment levels, both in physical and
human capital due to sharp decrease of the saving and investment rate. Our estimations
suggest that AIDS may have decrease in the long run the level of investment for Sub-
Saharan Africa. However AIDS5 di¤ers strongly from other major epidemics for at least
three reasons :
5It can be pointed out that the paludism epidemic exhibits the same properties than the AIDS epide-
mic. Consequently, the properties of the model might be extended to paludism, which is also endemic in
Subsaharian countries since several generations.
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 HIV-positive people do not always die right after been contaminated. They can
survive several years and still participate to the economy, although their productivity
is reduced ;
 family incurring health expenditures may undergo income loss and therefore reduce
their investment in physical capital and education ;
 current AIDS treatments can increase signicantly life expectancy of HIV-positive
people and also treatments against HIV have no signicant e¤ects if they are not
completely taken by patients.
The rst property is a good explanation for the fact that AIDS tends to become
endemic in many countries. As this disease spreads out and stabilizes in an economy, it is
likely that the epidemic has not only short-term consequences. The epidemic may modify
the behavior of several generations and have long-term e¤ects on economic growth. The
second property is also a channel through which AIDS have economic short and long
run consequences. The third property suggests that the ability of an economy to provide
massive access to treatment may be a key factor of long-run growth. Whereas a country
is rich or poor when hit by the epidemic, it is able to invest in health and prevent the life
expectancy to fall dramatically. It also implies that there may appear a threshold level of
investment or expenditures in health and AIDS treatments so as to prevent the epidemic
to a¤ect potential growth.
We develop a simple OLG model where each individual belongs to a household and
lives, at most, three periods. In the rst period of life agents are young and they receive
education or work at home for their parents. Therefore, learning has an opportunity cost
given by the forgone income by not producing at home. In the second period of life, the
individual inelastically supplies labor to the rm. However, ill people see there working
time reduced. The share of HIV- ill people is exogenously given and in every household
there is a part of adults who are ill. Only healthy people survive in the third period, so
they have to save for their old age consumption. The model in that settings look like
that of Corrigan and al. (2005). But it di¤ers in some important respect, that are in
their model health expenditures enters in the utility function. While we consider health
expenditures have a positive e¤ect on life expectancy. However, the e¤ects of treatments
are insignicant on life expectancy when the quantity of drugs taken by the patients
remain below a threshold.
3.2 Model features
A representative household is considered, whose members are both HIV-positive and
healthy. Life is divided into three periods : childhood denoted (0), adult life, denoted (1)
and retirement, denoted (2). Only healthy people enjoy the third period of life. Each adult
people has one child. Utility of adult people is assumed to be logarithmic and depends on
consumption in the adult life c1 and in the retirement period c2 and the human capital
level of the elder h+1. Adults are altruistic and they invest in their childrens education.
Hence the utility of a healthy individual can be written as follows, where  and  are
exogenous preference parameters :
UH = ln (c1) +  lnh+1 +  ln c2 (2)
And the utility of an HIV-positive adult can be written as :
UA = ln(c1) +  lnh+1 (3)
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The head of household takes decisions regarding savings, investment in the children
education, consumption during adult life and retirement and health expenditure so as to
maximize the average utility of the adults of the household. For reasons of simplicity, it
is supposed that a fraction a of each household is HIV-positive. Then the utility to be
maximize is :
U = UH (1  a) + aUA = ln (c1) +  lnh+1 +  (1  a) ln c2 (4)
The expenditure devoted to education of the children is denoted ewh. We suppose
that ill people can only work a time l < 1. Therefore in each household, the duration
of adult work is 1   a + al   e. Children are supposed to work during a time b in the
behalf of their parents. Therefore, their productivity only depends on the human capital
of their parents. Denoting S the savings of the household, m the health expenditure, w
the wage and r the physical capital returns, the budget constraints of adult period (1)
and retirement period (2) are :
c1 + S +m+ ewh = wh (1  a+ al + b) (5)
c2 = (1 + r)S (6)
Human capital is accumulated by children according to a standard function. Human
capital of the children depends of parental human capital h and time devoted to education
e. We suppose that HIV-positive adults are less e¢ cient to educate children, they can only
spent a fraction l of their time educating their children. Therefore, human capital of the
children is assumed to be an increasing function of the share of healthy adults in the
household. Given ; ;  and  exogenous parameters, the human capital accumulation
process is :
h+1 = h
e (1  a+ al) (7)
For matter of simplicity, we assume that the time l can be interpreted as an indicator of
life expectancy of HIV-positive people. Eventually, we assume that health expenditure has
a positive e¤ects on life expectancy and if it is strictly above an exogenous threshold m.
Life expectancy of healthy people is supposed to be 1. As life expectancy is bounded when





:We assume that health expenditure has no e¤ect when it is below
an exogenous amount per capita m. Moreover, we assume that health expenditure has


















 l if m > am
(8)
On the production side, we assume that the production function is Cobb-Douglas,
using aggregated human capital N , physical capital K. Average human capital H have a
positive external e¤ect on the productivity.
Y = AKHN1  (9)
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We suppose that there exist a continuum of households i; I = fig ;which may di¤er by
their level of human capital but not by there share of HIV-positive people, which remains
equal to a among each household. The density of i is denoted dGi:





where q denotes the e¢ cient time available for work (see below). The average human










3.2.1 The household decisions
We make the assumption that the head of household does not take into account the
impact of medical expenditure on the utility. The weight of consumption during the second
period is assumed as exogenous and denoted a: It is convenient to dene the e¢ cient time




N = q (a;m) + b
q =







if m  am
1  a+ al  q if m > am
(13)
The household utility can be rewritten using the budget constraints as a function eU
of investment in education e; savings S and health expenditure m :
eU (e;m; S) = ln (wh (q (m)  e+ b)  S  m) +  ln e+ (1  a) lnS (14)
To ease the notations, we introduce the labour income per time unit of labour y = wh
and the smallest value of e¢ cient time q0  1  a+ al0:
Proposition 1 There is a single threshold level of labor income by such that households
whose labor income is below by do not invest in health and other households invest a
constant expenditure by HIV-positive member of the household m:
Proof. For every value of m; the utility function tends toward minus innity when e or S
tends toward 0: As the utility is well dened for strictly positive values of e and S, and for
every value of m, it is maximized for a couple of strictly positive value of e and S:Partial
derivatives of the utility function with e and S are C1 for every value of m: Hence for
12
every value of m, the utility is maximized considering e and S when the following rst








 (1  a)bS (16)




1 +  +  (1  a) (17)
Therefore the maximization of eU (e;m; S) is equivalent to the maximization of c1 given
the conditions (13), (14) and (15). Let us note the function  (m) = yq (m)   m. The
maximization of c1 is equivalent to the maximization of the function  (m). This function
is continuous on [0;1[. It is strictly decreasing on ]am;1[: On [0; am], its variations are







  1: Therefore, the function  has two potential local
maxima, which are 0 and am. Thus the optimal health expenditure is 0 or am whether
 (0) >  (am) : This condition is equivalent to










Household choices when the needed medical expenditure is too high
When the labor income is insu¢ cient to invest in health, the education expenditure is
e =

1 +  +  (1  a) (q0 + b)  e0 (19)
The investment in physical capital is :
S =
 (1  a)
1 +  +  (1  a) (q0 + b) y0  S0 (20)
Household choices when the needed medical expenditure is too high
When the household income is su¢ cient, the medical expenditure is :
m = am (21)
The life expectancy l becomes :
l = l (22)
The education investment depends of the labour income y
e (y) =

1 +  +  (1  a)









1 +  +  (1  a)y1





To solve the model, it is necessary to study the behavior of the rm to obtain the
value of the real wage. To do so, it is necessary to know the distribution of human capital
in the economy. We will study three di¤erent cases :
1. In the rst case, we consider a representative household. Thus, there is only one
type of household in the economy and the distribution degenerates in a single point.
2. In the second case, we consider that there are two di¤erent households in the eco-
nomy and we assume that their relative weight in the total population is exogenous
and constant over time. We denote  the share of the poorest household, that is the
household which is less endowed with human capital.
3. In the last case, we suppose that health care are provided by the government. The
government taxes household income at an exogenous rate  and use all the collected
resources to invest in health.
3.2.2 Decisions of the rm
The rm demands physical capital and labor in order to maximize its benets. This
leads to two rst orders condition, on human and physical capital. The condition on
human capital allows to set the wage and the condition on physical capital gives capital
returns rate. In a perfect competition equilibrium, marginal productivity of labour equals
remuneration. This leads to :








1. In the rst case, the value of capital stock, labour force and human capital can be
replaced directly using (22) and (23).
w = (1  )
0@  (1  a)
1 +  +  (1  a)
y






When the representative household has a low income, it does not invest in health and
the equilibrium value of wage degenerates to :
w1 0 = (1  )

 (1  a)
1 +  +  (1  a)

h0 (27)
When the representative household has a higher income, the wage becomes :
w1  = (1  )

 (1  a)
1 +  +  (1  a)

1  am
y1 (q + b)

h1 (28)
2. In the second case, the wage is given by :
w1  = (1  )

 (1  a)
1 +  +  (1  a)

1  (1  ) am
w ( (q0 + b)h0 + (1  ) (q + b)h1)

(h0 + (1  )h1)
(29)
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3. In the third case, there are no private health expenditure. The investment rate in
education and the life expenditure become identical for every type of households.
e = (1  ) 
1 +  +  (1  a) (q () + b) (30)
Therefore, there is only one type of household in the equilibrium. The wage becomes
then :
w1  = (1  )

 (1  a)




In the long run, the economy is completely described by the distribution of human
capital. This distribution is degenerated into one or two mass points, which are called low
and high equilibria. In this section, we study the existence of this equilibria and therefore
the form of the stationary distribution. We make the following assumptions to ensure the
further propositions.
Assumption 2 The e¢ cient time of an HIV-infected agent which is not under medica-
tion, l0 is small.
Assumption 3 The health expenditure of the rich household compared to its labour in-
come is limited am
wh1(q+b)
:
Assumption 4 The level of externality of human capital  is small.
3.3.1 Low equilibrium
We name "low equilibrium" the stationary level of human capital of a dynasty such
that health expenditures in this dynasty are always null. In this case, the stationary level









The labour income is therefore :
y0  wh0 (33)
The condition of existence of a stable low equilibrium is thus given by the condition :
wh0 < by (34)
Proposition 5 In a private health system (case 1 and 2), for a su¢ ciently small q0
and for su¢ ciently large b, there exist for  and m given a threshold value of the HIV
prevalence rate in the population ba (;m) such that the low equilibrium exists, if and only
if a > ba:
Proof. The steady state of the economy is described by two equations : the equilibrium on
the labour market and the stationary of human capital. The stationary human capital of
the richest household is given by a function of HIV prevalence rate a, the human capital
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of the richest household itself h1, and the equilibrium wage per unit of human capital and
time work, w;H:The equilibrium wage is a function of a; w; h1 and h0 also, as given by
(NN) :
w  
 (a; w; h1; h0)



















































1 +  +  (1  a)

< 0
In addition to that, we have directly, @

@a
< 0 and @

@h1
> 0:Using the previous property,
@H
@h1
< 0: Moreover, a simple calculus shows that @H
@h1
< 1:Thus, the numerator of (NN)
is positive. To determine the sign of the denominator, let us note :
z = (1  ) am




wh1 (q + b)



















(1  ) (q + b)h1





















h0 + (1  )h1
The denominator  becomes then :














(1  ) (q + b)h1
( (q0 + b)h0 + (1  ) (q + b)h1)
!
(38)
The denominator is consequently positive for x su¢ ciently small as z < x: Taking  = 0; 2
and  +  < 1;the condition  > 0 is veried for x < 4
7
which seems to be a good
compromise. Making this assumption, we obtain dw
da
< 0. As dh0
da
< 0, we can conclude
that the labour income of the poor household is a decreasing function of HIV-prevalence
in the economy. Therefore for other parameters given, there is an unique threshold value
of a such that wh0 < by:High equilibrium
Proposition 6 In a private health system, there is a threshold value of maximal AIDS
treatments bm, such that the low equilibrium exists, if and only if m > bm:



















For other parameters given, there is therefore a single value of m such that wh0 = by:
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3.3.2 High equilibrium
We name "high equilibrium" the stationary level of human capital of a dynasty such
that health expenditure are not null. Using the condition (NN), we obtain a relation





1 +  +  (1  a)
=1  
1  am
wh1 (q + b)
=1 
(q + b)=1  q=1   H (a; w; h1)
(39)
Proposition 7 Making the same assumption as before on the parameters, there is an
unique stationary value of the human capital such that the health expenditure of the dynasty
is not null.
Proof. We have already proven that when there are two type of households,dw
da
> 0 As
the function w (a; ) is continuous, there is at most one equilibrium for  give.
In the steady state, the distribution of human capital in the economy corresponds to
one or two mass points, h0 and h1:The stability of the low equilibrium has already been
studied.
Proposition 8 Making the same assumptions than previously, for given values of para-
meters  and m, there is a threshold value of a;such that the high equilibrium is stable if
and only if a < ea;with ea < ba













Consequently, the stationary labour income of the richest household is a decreasing func-
tion of HIV-prevalence. Therefore, there exists an unique threshold value of a such that
wh1 = by: Moreover, this threshold is greater than ba if and onlu if h1 > h0 which is likely.
When the low equilibrium is stable, there exists a poverty trap : some households
which have not accumulated enough human capital when the epidemic spreads out will
not be able to invest in health and, the human capital of the dynasty will converge to the
low equilibrium.
Denition 9 A poverty trap is dened as the set A = [ba; 1], such that for any a 2 A, the
human capital of dynasties whose initial human capital is near to zero converges to the
low equilibrium.
4 Policy analysis
4.1 Inuence of human capital distribution on the poverty trap
We know that for any initial distribution of human capital in the economy, the sta-
tionary distribution is a two or a one mass point, located in h0 and h1 () : The relative
weight of the two mass points, described by the parameters  depends obviously on the
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initial distribution. But to simplify the problem, we suppose that the economy is ini-
tially constituted of only two types of households, one which is poorer than the other.
We assume that the relative weight of the poorest household in the economy is : Due to
the interaction on the labour market, the stationary position of the two households de-
pends of their own initial position but also of the initial position of the other household.
Three congurations are possible. First, the initial position of both households may be
low. In this case, both households converge to the low equilibrium. The opposite case is
also possible, where both households converge to the high equilibrium. Eventually, there
can be at the steady state a household in the low equilibrium and another in the high
equilibrium. In the case where both equilibria are stable, we can wonder what could be
the consequences of an increase of the aggregated human capital in the economy, that is
a decrease of , on the poverty trap.
Proposition 10 When human capital externalities on the labour market () are small,
an increase of initial aggregated human capital in the economy has a negative e¤ect on
the lower bound of the poverty trap.
Proof. For low , the derivative of wage according to  is positive, using the system
(NN).Therefore, the threshold value ba is an decreasing function of :
To reduce the size of the poverty trap, one can think to subsidy education or health.
As we just saw it, subsidizing education, that is a greater  is not good. Let us study the
case of a public health system.
4.2 E¤ects of public health expenditure on the poverty trap
Proposition 11 When there is only one type of household in the economy, and when
both low and high equilibrium are stable, there is a threshold level of human capital bh such
that the human capital of a household converges toward h0 or h1 whether their initial
human capital is below or above bh:
Proof. Let us assume that both equilibrium are stable. The threshold value of human
capital is given by the following condition :
w (h)h = by () (1  ) 11    (1  a)










() bh1 + = by
(1  )

1  amby (q + b)

1 +  +  (1  a)
 (1  a)

Using Taylor development at order 1 of the following system allows to show that for any


























Proposition 12 When health expenditure are nanced through a tax on labour income,
there is only one type of households in the steady state.
Proof. This corresponds to the third case. As health expenditure are similar for every
households, the life expectancy and consequently the investment in education are similar
among all dynasties. Therefore, the human capital of dynasties converges to the same
value in all the economy.
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Proposition 13 There is a value of a0 > ba, such that for any a < a0, subsidizing health
expenditure allows the overall dynasties of the economy to escape the poverty trap.
Proof. For a given rate of tax , the stationary human capital becomes :
h / q ()=1  ((q () + b) (1  ))=1 
This function is dened and bounded in  2 [0; 1]. Therefore, there exists a value  of 
which maximizes h: In the long run, if h > bh; the overall economy would converge to
the high equilibrium when the tax is removed. Public health expenditure allows to reduce
the poverty trap.
Therefore, when the country is not heavily a¤ected by AIDS, a scal response may be
su¢ cient to put the economy on the high growth path. In the other case however, there
is no other choice than reducing the price of HIV treatments m to make the poverty trap
disappear.
5 Concluding remarks
Our estimation suggests that AIDS epidemics is having strong negative e¤ects on
demographic variables as fertility rate and life expectancy on Sub-Saharan Africa. It
is also decreasing the working age population. We also nd some negative e¤ects on
macroeconomic variables, namely capital intensity and investment rate. It is also damaging
investment in education. However, we found in our estimation no signicant evidence of
a negative AIDSe¤ects on growth. The epidemics may have positive e¤ect on growth in
the short run by a capital deepening e¤ect. But, in the long run, due to its negative e¤ects
on accumulable factors, AIDS is more likely to have strong negative e¤ect on growth.
In our model we show that AIDS epidemic may induce a poverty trap for some coun-
tries. The occurrence of such poverty trap depends on the degree of which the epidemics
had spread into the economy. A huge number of people contaminated in the country can
settle the economy in a poverty trap. We show that, in such case, subsidizing education is
not e¢ cient to escape the economy from the poverty trap. Either, subsidizing health care
expenditures is e¢ cient only for some degree of expansion of the epidemics. One remain
solution, we havent check, is to deal with the price of drugs.
Appendix
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Country urb wars ptpr gdp inv pop fert lifex mort pge sge AIDS
Angola 37 37 29 37 37 37 37 37 37 30 33 33
Burundi 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37
Benin 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 36 37
Burkina Faso 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37
Botswana 37 37 36 37 37 37 37 37 37 36 36 37
Central African Republic 37 37 22 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 33 37
Cote dIvoire 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 33 37
Cameroon 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37
Congo,Rep. 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 35 37
Comoros 37 37 36 37 37 37 30 37 37 36 36 37
Cape Verde 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37
Eritrea 37 37 16 17 17 37 37 37 37 17 15 37
Ethiopia 37 37 30 17 17 37 37 37 37 37 37 37
Gabon 37 37 35 37 37 37 37 37 37 15 22 37
Ghana 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37
Guinea 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37
Gambia,The 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37
Guinea-Bissau 37 37 32 37 37 37 37 37 37 32 32 37
Equatorial Guinea 37 37 24 37 37 37 37 37 37 16 21 37
Kenya 37 37 36 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37
Liberia 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 32 31 28
Lesotho 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37
Madagascar 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37
Mali 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37
Mozambique 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37
Mauritania 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37
Mauritius 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 36 37
Malawi 37 37 26 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37
Namibia 37 37 15 37 37 37 37 37 37 17 21 37
Niger 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37
Nigeria 37 37 36 37 37 37 37 37 37 36 36 37
Rwanda 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 36 37
Sudan 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37
Senegal 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37
SierraLeone 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37
Somalia 37 37 16 37 37 37 37 37 37 27 27 30
Sao Tome and Principe 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 8 5 37
Swaziland 37 37 36 37 37 37 37 37 37 36 36 37
Seychelles 37 37 37 37 37 0 31 25 0 9 9 37
Chad 37 37 36 37 37 37 37 37 37 36 36 37
Togo 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 36 37
Tanzania 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 30 37
Uganda 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 36 37
South Africa 37 37 25 37 37 37 37 37 37 35 19 37
Congo, Dem.Rep. 37 37 34 37 37 37 37 37 37 34 34 36
Zambia 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 36 37
Zimbabwe 37 37 32 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37
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